Title VII "supervisor" must affect terms and conditions of employment

Under Title VII, an employer can be held liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor. That situation differs from a hostile work environment created by a co-worker, where the company is liable only if the complainant can show that the company was negligent in discovering or remedying the situation. Recently, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the definition of “supervisor” under Title VII, and determined that a supervisor is not a person who simply possesses authority to oversee an individual’s job performance. In order to be classified as a “supervisor” for purposes of liability under Title VII, that person must have the power to “directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment,” including the power to hire, fire, promote, or demote. Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Company, Nos. 07-2387 and 07-2390 (7th Circ. November 7, 2008).

Sanjay Andonissamy, a French citizen of Indian ethnicity, worked as a systems engineer for Hewlett-Packard. In that capacity, and based upon H-P’s sponsorship of his H-1B visa, he was assigned to the Qwest Cyber Center in Chicago from April 2001 through June 2003. Andonissamy alleged that during his tenure at Qwest, his supervisor (Smith) made racist comments, including remarks that U.S. citizens were unable to find jobs because “people like Andonissamy” had taken them. Andonissamy complained about Smith’s remarks and treatment. H-P and Qwest asserted that while Andonissamy’s technical skills were strong, his relationships with co-workers and customers were not strong, and that the company had received complaints that Andonissamy treated people rudely. After a complaint from a customer in 2002, Smith put Andonissamy on a performance improvement plan. Subsequently, Andonissamy’s performance deteriorated, with missed deadlines increasing, and additional complaints about Andonissamy from both Qwest and customers.

In March 2003, H-P’s human resource department undertook an investigation, and determined that a performance warning should be issued to Andonissamy. After the issuance of that warning on May 5, Andonissamy continued to miss deadlines and refused to train a back-up person to assist him. In June 2003, Qwest refused to allow Andonissamy’s return to the Cyber Center, and Andonissamy’s employment with HP was terminated. In 2004, Andonissamy filed a federal court complaint against both H-P and Qwest, which included national origin discrimination and violation of the FMLA, based upon denial of a requested leave for depression.

The lower court dismissed all of Andonissamy’s claims on summary judgment, and that decision was upheld on appeal. After analyzing each of Andonissamy’s claims, the Seventh Circuit found that none were sufficiently supported. The most interesting part of the analysis is the court’s characterization of the national origin/hostile environment claim under Title VII.

First the court set forth the elements necessary to survive summary judgment on a claim of hostile environment, stating that a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was subjected to unwanted harassment; (2) the harassment was based upon national origin; (3) the harassment was severe and pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. The court never reached the question of whether Andonissamy’s workplace was a hostile environment. Instead, it held that Andonissamy had not established a basis for employer liability, because he was unable to establish that Smith possessed sufficient authority to be classified as a “supervisor” under Title VII. Smith did not hire or fire Andonissamy, and while Smith was able to recommended disciplinary action, H-P’s human resource department had to conduct an investigation and issue its own recommendation prior to discipline being imposed.

 In this case, the court specifically stated that “directing work activities and recommending disciplinary action are not in and of themselves sufficient to make someone a supervisor under Title VII.” However, employers should not take this as an open invitation to overlook situations in which nominal managers act unprofessionally toward subordinates. The result of this case turned on the specific circumstances of the relationship between Smith and Andonissamy, and the fact that Smith did not have direct authority to hire, fire, or discipline Andonissamy. In addition, H-P had carefully documented Andonissamy’s original complaints about Smith, and was able to show that those complaints did not include allegation of national origin discrimination. Therefore, the company was not on notice of the nature of Andonissamy’s claims against Smith and could not be deemed to have been liable for discrimination.

"Regarded as disabled" claim requires exclusion from range of jobs.

U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found that an employer’s failure to rehire an individual after layoff, based on the employee’s opiate-based prescription medication, did not violate the ADA. However, in an example of the overlap between the ADA and the FMLA, the court allowed the employee’s FMLA retaliation claim to go forward to trial, based upon a manager’s statements related to the same employee’s medical leave. Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., No. 05-02787 (6th Circ. Oct. 16, 2008).  

James Daugherty worked for Sajar Plastics as a maintenance technician from 1991 until his layoff on January 5, 2004. In that capacity, he maintained buildings and equipment, often using hand and power tools, and operated certain heavy machinery including forklifts and overhead cranes.

In 2000 and 2001, Daugherty suffered flare ups of a previous back injury. To manage pain associated with those flare ups, Daugherty was prescribed increasing doses of Oxycontin and Duragesic, both opiate-based medications. Daugherty also requested and was granted intermittent FMLA leave during period of increased pain. In November 2003, Daugherty requested a lengthy period of such leave, and provided a doctor’s note that he would be able to return to work in January 2004. Daugherty claims that Sajar’s HR Director (Alexander) told him at that time that if he took FMLA leave for that period, “there would not be a job waiting for [him] when [he] returned.” Alexander disputes that claim.

Soon after Daugherty went on leave, Sajar began a round of lay offs. Because Dougherty was the least senior maintenance worker, it was decided that he would be laid off upon his return from leave. However, within a month, Sajar experienced an increase in business and decided to recall Daugherty to work. Alexander made the re-hire contingent upon passing a physical examination conducted by Dr. Altemus, who was routinely used by the company for pre-employment physicals. While Dr. Altemus found Dougherty physically able to perform the functions of the position, he expressed concerns about Dougherty’s medications, stating that “the analgesics may mask the symptoms of re-injury,” and “may cause am impairment of perception or judgment which might lead to an injury to himself or others.” Sajar then called Daugherty and told him that if he could provide documentation regarding a “reduction in his medications,” the company would consider re-employing him. Dougherty failed to provide that documentation, even after repeated requests, and his employment ultimately was terminated.

Daugherty then filed a lawsuit alleging that Sajar regarded him as disabled and that it violated the ADA when it failed to rehire him. He also claimed that his termination was in retaliation for his FMLA leave. The lower court granted Sajar’s motion for summary judgment on both claims, and Daugherty appealed.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that Sajar’s decision regarding Daugherty’s employment did not violate the ADA. To support a regarded-as-disabled claim, a plaintiff must show that the employer regards him as unable to perform a broad class or range of jobs. Dr. Altemus’ viewpoint regarding Dougherty’s medication restricted Dougherty only from the maintenance technician positions at Sajar and, therefore, was not sufficient to support his ADA regarded-as-disabled claim. However, the court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of Dougherty’s FMLA claim. The court held that Dougherty presented “direct evidence” of discrimination in the form of Alexander’s threat that the FMLA leave would affect Dougherty’s continued employment, and that a jury could find a “clear connection” between the FMLA leave and Sajar’s ultimate decision to terminate Dougherty’s employment.

As the number of cases filed under the “regarded as” provision of the ADA continues to increase, it is imperative for employers to be familiar with the standard of proof required to overcome that claim. In this case, the fact that the company was willing to continue to employ the individual if he was able to work with his physician to decrease the amount of his opiate-based medication indicated a perception on the part of the company that Dougherty was able to be employed in some capacity and, therefore, precluded a claim that the company was excluding Dougherty from a broad range of employment positions. In this case, the company’s effort to find a mutually beneficial resolution to the issue - while unsuccessful - had the ultimate effect of helping the company to avoid liability under the ADA.