Use of subjective hiring criteria by employer is not unlawful, per se.

Recently, the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a company’s testing and interview procedure for new hires, and decided that certain subjective hiring criteria did not necessarily create a mechanism for excluding female applicants. That review occurred in the context of a lawsuit brought by a female applicant who alleged gender discrimination when the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) refused to hire her for an entry level position at its power plant. Turner v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 10th Cir., No. 07-1396, April 28, 2009.

Susan Turner applied for a “Plant Specialist C” position at PSCo’s Comanche Power Plant in 2000, 2004, and 2006. To evaluate applicants for this position, PSCo used a 3-step process. First, it gave a written test related to mechanical aptitude. Applicants who passed that test moved to a second stage, in which candidates’ resumes were reviewed for relevant experience and skills, for which points were awarded. The applicants with the highest number of points advanced to the third stage, which consisted of an interview with a panel of four PSCo employees. The interview consisted of a set of pre-selected questions -- used for each interviewee -- which addressed skills like initiative and risk taking, adaptability, dealing with ambiguity, and team building. Each interviewer assigned a numerical rating to each candidate. After the interviews, the panel decided on consensus scores for each applicant’s competencies.

During the hiring process in 2006, Turner reached the interview stage, but was not hired. She received the second lowest rating of any interviewee, and later testified that she felt that she had “struggled” throught the whole thing. The only other female applicant received the second highest rating, but refused the offer of employment from PSCo. After Turner was unsuccessful in her 2006 attempt for the Plane Specialist position, she brought a lawsuit, alleging that PSCo’s hiring process was discriminatory. The lower court granted summary judgment for PSCo, and Turner appealed.

On review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision, largely on the basis that Turner was unable to show that the company’s hiring criteria were simply a pretext for discrimination. Under the now-familiar McDonnell Douglas mechanism, Turner was required to set forth a prima facie case, including the facts that she is a member of a protected class, she suffered an adverse employment action, she was qualified for the position, and that she was treated less favorably than others outside her protected class. Once that prima facie case is established, PSCo had to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to hire Turner. In order to successfully substantiate her claim of discrimination, Turner was then required to show that PSCo’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring her was merely a pretext, and that the actual reason was discrimination.

The lower court found that Turner did, in fact, establish a prima facie case, and the Tenth Circuit agreed. Further, PSCo was found to have proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Turner: she “performed poorly in her interview.” Although Turner argued that the interview process was a sham meant to hide the company’s discriminatory hiring practices, the court disagreed, stating that although “the presence of subjective decision-making can create a strong inference of discrimination,” the use of subjective criteria is “not unlawful per se.” The court pointed out that each applicant answered the same questions during PSCo’s interviews, and that the criteria used for ranking the candidates was predetermined in a written company document. Further, the company was able to link the substance of the questions to job-related competencies. According to the court, Turner provided no evidence that the interviewers injected their own additional subjective criteria into the process, and therefore, was unable to carry her burden of showing some discriminatory animus.

The key to this decision was the standardization of the company’s interview process. The questions were pre-set, written, job-related, and asked consistently of each applicant, and the interviewers were not given the discretion to determine the scope of the interview. Because the same questions were used for all applicants, and because the evaluations were based upon pre-discussed criteria and not “whims or unguided opinions,” the company prevailed.
 

Sarbanes-Oxley's 90-day statute of limitations not triggered by conditional firing.

An employee alleging a violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) must file a complaint within 90 days from the date of that alleged violation. That 90-day period begins to run from the date on which the complainant knows or reasonably should know that the complained-of act has occurred. In whistleblower cases under SOX, the 90-day statute of limitations runs from the date on which the employee receives “final, definitive, and unequivocal notice” of an adverse employment decision. As defined in SOX, the term “unequivocal” means that the notice is not ambiguous, and is free from misleading possibilities.

On April 30, 2009, a Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (ARB) determined that an employer’s notice to its employee was ambiguous and did not trigger the 90-day statute of limitations, because the letter included language that indicated that the company was willing to review and consider any evidence from the employee that could refute the termination decision. Snyder v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, DOL ARB, No. 09-008 (4/30/09, released 5/7/09). Based on that fact, the employee’s complaint to OSHA was timely, even though the complaint was filed more than six months after the employee received the letter which ostensibly indicated that the company had decided to terminate his employment.

Gregg Snyder was employed by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals as an Engineer IV, responsible for all Building System functions at the company’s Cambridge, Massachusetts facility. In September 2007, Wyeth’s HR director informed Snyder that he was being suspended with pay pending an investigation of allegations that he had improperly accessed confidential information. On October 1, while suspended, Snyder sent an e-mail to Wyeth, alleging certain Code of Conduct violations by Wyeth officials, and alleging that his suspension was part of a continuing course of retaliation by Wyeth. On October 17, Snyder received a letter from Wyeth’s HR Director (Lingen) which stated that prior to Snyder’s October 1 e-mail, the company already had made a decision to terminate Snyder’s employment. However, the letter also stated that “if you would to provide me with specific information in writing as to why you think your termination is not justified or specific details of the ‘harassment’ you feel you have received, I would be happy to review it.” Snyder responded on October 19 by again alleging retaliation and harassment.

On February 11, 2008, Wyeth sent a letter to Snyder stating that the company “has concluded that the decision to terminate your employment is appropriate,” and informed Snyder that the termination was effective as of that date.

On May 8, 2008, Snyder filed a SOX complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). OSHA found that the complaint was untimely because it had not been filed within 90 days of October 17, when Snyder received Lingen’s letter regarding the pre-October decision to terminate him. Upon review, that decision was upheld by an Administrative Law Judge. However, the ARB subsequently reversed the decision, finding that the wording of Lingen’s letter offered to allow Snyder to provide information that might change the termination decision, injecting an element of ambiguity into the communication. Therefore, the letter did not constitute a final, definitive, and unequivocal notice of termination sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations.

This decision tells employers that threats of termination that include either an opportunity for performance improvement or a mechanism for avoiding the threatened firing do not actually constitute the “final, definitive, and unequivocal notice” necessary to start to 90-day statute of limitation running under SOX for a whistleblower claim. While this should not preclude employers from allowing individuals to avoid employment termination by improving performance, it does provide a warning that once a termination decision is made and appropriately substantiated, it should be implemented without delay, unless there is a legitimate business-related reason for that delay.

 

EEOC supplements its 2007 guidance regarding caregiver discrimination.

In 2007, during a nationwide upsurge in pregnancy discrimination claims, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) released a set of guidelines advising employers on issues related to caregiver bias. On April 22, 2009, the EEOC further supplemented those guidelines with specific recommendations designed, it said, to help employers to “reduce the chance of EEO violations against caregivers, and to remove barriers to equal employment opportunity.” The document can be found at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html.

The caregiving responsibilities addressed in the EEOC’s recent guidance include not only childcare, but care to parents and older family members, as well as to relatives with disabilities. The primary directives issued include: (1) development and dissemination of a “strong EEO policy” that addresses the types of conduct that may constitute discrimination; (2) training managers to recognize legal obligations created by anti-discrimination statutes and ensuring compliance with policies that support those obligations; (3) effective response to complaints of caregiver discrimination; and (4) providing clear assurance to caregiver/employees of protection from retaliation for such complaints.

The document also addresses issues related to recruitment, hiring, and promotion of employees with caregiving responsibilities, and includes specific suggestions in those areas. For example, the EEOC suggests developing specific job-related qualification standards for each position, to reflect the duties, functions, and competencies of the position. Such standards can help to minimize the potential for gender stereotyping which, in turn, will minimize the opportunity for caregiver discrimination.

Another area addressed in the EEOC’s guidance is avoiding discriminatory treatment of caregivers through the “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Specifically, the EEOC suggests monitoring compensation practices for patterns of potential discrimination, and reviewing workplace policies that limit employee flexibility. The “best practices” include a number of flexible and reduced-time options, with examples of each. While not every example will be suitable for every employer, the guidance certainly informs employers of the expectations of the EEOC with respect to caregiver issues. Such information provides a sense of how these cases will be viewed by the Commission during its investigation and attempted resolution of discrimination charges in this area.

Many of the suggestions included in the guidance are similar to or parallel actions that employers currently are reviewing or enforcing to assure compliance with other recent employment law developments, including the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the recent FMLA regulations, and the upcoming Paycheck Fairness Act.

While the EEOC’s technical guidelines are designated as “best practices” - meaning that they are proactive measures recommended by the Commission, and are not statutory requirements - knowledgeable employers recognize that courts turn to the EEOC for direction in interpreting both federal and state anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, it is imperative that companies begin to train managers and supervisors on the content of this most recent guidance, to assure complete awareness of all legal obligations that may have an impact on decisions about treatment of employees with caregiver responsibilities.