Termination for obsolete skill set does not constitute age discrimination.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employers from treating employees who are 40 or older adversely on the basis of their age. Recently, however, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee’s “obsolete skill set” which caused him to be of “declining value” to the company was sufficient basis to support an that individual’s termination during a reduction in force (RIF), and found that the termination did not constitute age discrimination. Martino v. MCI Communications Services, Inc., No. 08-2405, 7th Cir., July 28, 2009.

Guy Martino began his employment with MCI in 2005 at the age of 54 as a business solutions consultant (BSC). In that position, he provided support to sales teams, but did not spearhead actual sales. In addition to his salary, Martino received commissions on sales to which he was assigned to work. For instance, in October 2005, Martino was part of a team working on a deal that involved British Petroleum (BO), and which resulted in substantial revenue to MCI. Although his role in that deal was peripheral, Martino received credit that boosted his sales figures and resulted in a sizeable commission to him. In fact, the BP deal resulted in nearly 85% of all of the commissions earned by Martino during his entire tenure with MCI.

Following MCI’s merger with Verizon in 2006, Verizon undertook a “redundancy analysis” to identify duplicative positions, and to support a reduction in force. As part of that analysis, a distinction was made between individuals who sold “co-location” services – which involved a client’s purchase of space, power, and cooling for its servers in the company’s data centers, but retaining management of those servers – and “managed” services, in which MCI/Verizon actually managed those servers. Co-location services were more basic, and therefore less expensive. When Verizon took over those sales, it removed the BSC force from sales of co-location services and assigned responsibility to them for the sale of managed services. Martino had only limited experience with the sale of managed services, and therefore became a prime target for termination, along with five other BSCs, ranging in age from 33 to 45.

Martino filed a federal court action, claiming age discrimination. While he conceded that the actual termination decision-makers did not discriminate against him, he invoked the “cat’s paw” theory to contend that his immediate supervisor was biased in favor of younger employees, and that the decision-makers were influenced by that bias. The cat’s paw theory is used when an adverse action is taken by an un-biased decision-maker, but on the basis of “singular influence” by a biased supervisor or manager. In this case, Martino argued that his direct supervisor sometimes called him an “oldtimer” which, according to Martino, indicated a bias in favor of younger workers. After stating that the term “doesn’t strike us as inherently offensive,” the court found that the two individuals who actually made the RIF decisions did an independent analysis of Martino’s qualifications, and based their decisions on business-related issues and skill-based criteria. According to the Court, the cat’s paw theory requires a “blind reliance” on input from a biased individual. That type of influence was not present with respect to Martino’s termination.

Martino’s skill set was limited, and Verizon’s increased focus on managed services, rather than collocation services, meant that Martino’s importance to the company was waning. Here, the Court specifically stated that while choosing to terminate someone on the basis of old age is impermissible, choosing to let someone go because they have an “obsolete skill set” is not discriminatory. The Court also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. made this case especially difficult for Martino. Under that decision, it’s not enough for a plaintiff to prove that age was one of the motivating factors of the adverse action – instead the plaintiff must prove that but for his age, the adverse action would not have occurred.

In this case, the basis of the company’s success was its independent evaluation of employees’ skills and value to the company. Employers should make sure that independent investigations and decisions are fully documented, and that analyses are based on the needs of the company, in order to avoid the “cat’s paw” theory attempted by Martino. Further, training and counseling of supervisors and secondary managers should be undertaken to avoid the appearance of impropriety that is raised by remarks that could be interpreted as discriminatory.
 

Rescinding employment benefit extended only to employees with military obligations does not violate the USERRA.

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) protects members of the armed services against employment discrimination related to the benefits of their employment. The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that such protection refers to employment benefits that are “extended generally to military and non-military employees alike,” and that discontinuing a benefit that had been extended only to employees with military obligations does not violate the USERRA. Crews v. Mt. Vernon, 7th Cir., No. 08-2435, June 2, 2009.

Ryan Crews, an officer of the Police Department in Mt. Vernon, Illinois, has been a member of the Army National Guard since 1988. As a Guard member, Crews is required to attend certain weekend training and preparedness exercises on a monthly basis. Under the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the police employees, the City has the discretion to establish work schedules to meet operational needs. Police officers’ weekly schedules typically consist of five 8-hour shifts and two days off. Crews’ military obligations frequently conflict with his work schedule. In these instances, the City has grants time-off to Crews (and other Guard member/employees) to attend drills. While the leave is unpaid, the City has allowed Guard member/employees to turn in their military pay in exchange for their regular City pay, so as not to incur any net loss in weekly wages. Guard member/employees also may allocate paid time off to days missed for military drill, thereby collecting both City pay and military pay for those days.

For several years, the City maintained a policy under which Crews was permitted to reschedule work shifts that fell on drill weekend, allowing him to use weekend-drill shifts as his weekly days off. This allowed Crews to collect military pay for the drill weekends, while also collecting his full weekly City pay. Three other Guard member/employees were granted this scheduling benefit between 2000 and 2003.

In 2006, the City hired two additional Guard member/employees. At that point, it was determined by the City that extending the policy to an increasing number of individuals would result in numerous and costly scheduling conflicts, because the policy allowed Guard member/employees to work weekday shifts that already were fully staffed. Following the policy’s rescission, Crews no longer can collect a full week’s pay during his drill weeks, unless he uses his limited paid time off. This problem is especially acute for Crews because, as a corporal, his regular work schedule is Wednesday through Sunday; he has no ability to bid for preferred days off like lower-ranking officers do.

In 2006, Crews filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the rescission of the work scheduling policy denied to him a “benefit of employment” based on his military status, in violation of the USERRA. The lower court denied Crews’ motion for summary judgment, and found in favor of the City. Crews appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which upheld that decision. According to the appellate court, the “benefit of employment” referenced in the USERRA is one that is provided to both military and non-military employees and, therefore, that law “reaches only discriminatory employment actions that provide military employees with fewer benefits.” Rescinding a preferential work schedule, thereby placing Crews on equal footing with other police department employees who required days off for non-military reasons, was not a violation of the USERRA.

The City’s ability, as set forth in the relevant collective bargaining agreement, to “establish work schedules to meet operational needs,” is likely to have been a factor in the Court’s analysis of this issue. Employers who plan to modify or eliminate preferential schedules previously granted to service member/employees should base such modification or elimination on a documented business reason. To do otherwise may support a claim of discriminatory treatment or retaliation under the USERRA.

USERRA does more than prevent discrimination and, according to the Department of Labor, “establishes a floor, not a ceiling, for the employment and reemployment rights and benefits of those it protects.” Therefore, nothing in the Seventh Circuit’s decision suggests that employers should not continue to provide greater benefits to military service members. Also, if such increased benefits are made part of a negotiated agreement, employers may be legally obligated to continue their implementation. In situations similar to this case, however, in which a more favorable work schedule was instituted solely for the convenience and benefit of military service members, it is likely that employers can modify or eliminate such benefit for business-related reasons without violating the USERRA.
 

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ADA's interactive process may require plaintiff to identify open position for transfer.

As defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the term “discriminate” includes an employer’s failure to make reasonable accommodations to the limitations of a disabled employee. Reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to a vacant position within the company. The 10th U.S. Circuit court of Appeals recently held that a disabled employee could not support her failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, because she did not present evidence of any specific vacant positions to which she could have been transferred. Iverson v. City of Shawnee, Kansas, 10th Cir., No. 08-3264, June 17, 2009.

Michelle Iverson, a police officer with the City of Shawnee, Kansas, suffered a back injury while on duty in 2005. After undergoing surgery for her condition, Iverson was unable to pass a re-qualification test to return to her position as a police officer. She then requested accommodation in the form of a transfer to an open assignment with the City as a detective or non-officer, but was told that there were no jobs available. Iverson filed suit, claiming that she “could have performed numerous positions within the [City] with or without reasonable accommodation.” However, she did not specifically identify any position for which she believed herself to be qualified. Based on that failure, the lower court entered summary judgment in favor of the City. That decision was upheld on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.

For an employee to establish a prima facie case in a failure-to-accommodate claim, the employee must show that she is disabled, that accommodation within the existing job cannot reasonably be accomplished, that she has asked for reassignment to a vacant position, that she is qualified (with or without reasonable accommodation) to perform one or more vacant jobs, and that she has suffered injury because the employer did not offer reassignment to any appropriate vacant position. The Tenth Circuit held that these criteria assume that the burden is on the employee to specifically identify the vacant position or positions for which she believes herself to be qualified. Without such information, the employee cannot subsequently claim that the company’s failure to engage in the interactive process has caused an injury because there is no actual evidence that the interactive process would have likely produced a reasonable accommodation.

In Iverson’s case, she alleged generally that she “could have performed numerous positions within the [City] with or without accommodation,” and, in fact, argued that she could have performed positions as “detective, records technician, police dispatcher, and clerical or administrative positions within the City.” However, she failed to identify any specific position as available at the time that she was requesting reassignment. That failure led the Court to hold in favor of the City.

While this decision is limited to the Tenth Circuit, the court’s rationale is clear: an employee alleging that her employer failed adequately participate in the ADA’s interactive process will lose on summary judgment if she fails to show that a reasonable accommodation was possible, and that the process would have led to such accommodation. This case does not create an excuse for employers’ non-participation in a search for reasonable accommodation of a disability. However, it does point out at least instance in which the employee’s failure to provide sufficient input into the process can keep a case from going forward to a jury.