Employment Law Matters : Employment Lawyer & Attorney : Ogletree Deakins Law Firm : Labor Law, Human Resources

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently re-visited a case on remand from the Third Circuit, and allowed an insurance company employee’s claims of FMLA interference and retaliation to go forward. Erdman v. Nationwide Insurance Co., M.D. Pa., No. 1:05-cv-0944, 1/15/10. The case is noteworthy on more than one point: first, the 3d Circuit remanded the case on a finding that the employee’s hours worked at home might be counted toward the 1250 minimum hours needed to be eligible for FMLA leave; second, that evidence of ongoing “antagonism” between the company and the employee might form the basis of FMLA retaliation; and finally, that a request for FMLA leave may be viewed as a “protected activity” under Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act.

Nationwide Insurance Company hired Brenda Erdman in 1980. Erdman was a full-time employee until 1998, when she began to work part-time in order to care for her daughter, who was born with Downs Syndrome. In 2002, Erdman’s request for a 4-day workweek schedule was granted. However, Erdman regularly worked extra hours from home, for which her supervisor consistently authorized payment, allowing Erdman to exercise “comp” time based upon those hours. In 2002, Erdman began to report to a new supervisor, and asked that person whether continued comp time would be allowed. Although there was no specific response, the supervisor made no initial objection to Erdman’s continued use of comp time. However, in September 2002, that supervisor admonished Erdman on a number of performance issues, and then told her that she could no longer use extra hours as “comp” time.

In February 2003, Nationwide informed Erdman that her part-time position was being eliminated, and offered her a full-time job, which Erdman accepted. In April 2003, Erdman submitted paperwork asking for FMLA leave for the month of August, which she needed to prepare her daughter for school. Nationwide fired Erdman on May 9, 2003, stating that it was doing so for prior workplace behavioral issues. Erdman filed a lawsuit against Nationwide, including claims under the FMLA and of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. In dismissing the case, the lower court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the company, holding that Erdman had not worked the necessary 1250 hours to qualify for FMLA leave. Erdman appealed.

1. Hours worked at home might count toward 1250 hour requirement.
Last year, the 3d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an issue of first impression for that court: whether Erdman’s of-site work hours could be counted toward the number of hours needed to qualify for leave under the FMLA. The Court decided that the issue was a question of fact, because the FMLA counts all work hours that an employer “knows or has reason to believe” are being worked by the employee. The Third Circuit held that a reasonable jury could conclude that Nationwide had constructive notice of the fact that Erdman had worked from home and, therefore, could find that she had worked the requisite number of hours to qualify for FMLA leave. The case was remanded back to the district court following that determination.

2. Ongoing antagonism supports FMLA retaliation claim
On remand, the district court specifically discussed Erdman’s FMLA retaliation claim, and determined that Erdman had provided sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether “ongoing antagonism” - including monitoring personal calls, misapplying company policies, and providing inconsistent reasons for the termination - to establish a causal link between her FMLA request and her firing. According to the court, those actions could allow a trier of fact to discredit the company’s contention that “incidents of inappropriate workplace behavior” prompted it to terminate Erdman’s employment.

3. FMLA can be “protected activity” under state law
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), Erdman must show that she “engaged in a protected activity” for which an adverse action was taken. In this case, Erdman claimed that the protected activity was her request for FMLA leave. She pointed out that the PHRA prohibits sex-based discrimination, and one basis of the FMLA as stated by Congress is to “expressly delineate how sexual/gender discrimination can occur in caretaker roles and how the purpose of the FMLA is to minimize employment discrimination based on sex.” Here, the district court predicted that, although Pennsylvania courts have not yet addressed the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that an FMLA request qualifies as a protected activity under the PHRA, and therefore denied Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment on the PHRA retaliation claim.

This case is one which employers should review and understand before taking an adverse employment action against any employee who is on FMLA leave or who has requested such a leave. While employers are entitled to impose disciplinary actions based upon violation of company policies and procedures, such actions cannot be based upon an employee’s FMLA leave. Importantly, an employee’s FMLA-related absences or intermittent-leave schedule does not provide a sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against that employee.
 

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Under Title VII, an unlawful employment practice is established when an employee demonstrates that gender is a motivating factor for an adverse employment action. Under that analysis, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Title VII claims of a female hotel desk clerk who was fired after a company decision-maker complained that the employee lacked the pretty and “Midwestern girl” look desirable in a front desk employee. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., 8th Cir., No. 08-3860, Jan. 21, 2010.

Brenna Lewis began working for Heartland Inns of America in July 2005, starting out as a night auditor. In that job, Lewis worked the front desk from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., doing it well enough to receive two merit-based pay raises and positive customer feedback.

In December 2006, Lewis’ manager, Lori Stifel, received permission over the telephone from the company’s Director of Operations, Barbara Cullinan, to offer to Lewis a daytime (7 a.m. to 3 p.m.) shift position on the front desk. Lewis accepted, and took over that position at the end of December. Although Cullinan initially had approved Lewis’ move to the day shift, her attitude changed after she met Lewis in person. At that point, Cullinan told Stipel that she wasn’t sure that Lewis was a “good fit” for the position, as Lewis lacked the “Midwestern girl” look that Cullinan felt was necessary at the front desk. By her own admission, Lewis is “slightly more masculine,” avoids makeup, and wears mens’ button down shirts and slacks. She has been mistaken for a male, and has been referred to as “tomboyish.” However, while Cullinan felt that front desk staff should be “pretty,” the front desk job description in Heartland’s personnel manual does not mention appearance.

Cullinan ordered Stifel to return Lewis to the overnight shift. When Stifel refused, Cullinan insisted that Stifel resign. Cullinan then required Lewis to re-interview for the day shift position, even though Lewis had held the position successfully for over a month. Lew protested, but attended the interview. Three days later, Lewis was fired. In its termination letter, Heartland stated that Lewis was “hostile” toward company policies and had attempted the “thwart” the interview process. Lewis then filed a lawsuit, asserting that Heartland fired her for not confirming to sexual stereotypes, and claiming that such conduct violated Title VII. The lower court disagreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the company. On appeal, the 8th Circuit reversed that decision, holding that sexual stereotyping can violate Title VII when it influences employment decisions.

Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon sex. In this case, Lewis provided evidence that Heartland found her unsuited for her front desk job based, not upon her work performance, but upon an appearance that was inconsistent with the company’s preferred feminine stereotype. At the summary judgment phase of a case, the question is whether a plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could find that the individual was discriminated against because of her sex. Here, the 8th Circuit found that Cullinan’s remarks, along with her discharge of Stifel for not taking Lewis off the front desk, and her imposition of a second interview even after Lewis performed successfully in the position, clearly provided such evidence.

The line between sexual orientation – which is not yet prohibited by federal law – and discrimination “because of sex” can be difficult to draw. However, employers must recognize that an employer who takes an adverse action against an individual because he or she does not fit within sexual stereotypes is engaging in sex discrimination because that discrimination would not have occurred but for the individual’s sex. If a company’s disciplinary actions are meant to punish or belittle non-compliance with gender stereotypes, the actions may constitute a violation of Title VII’s “because of sex” provision.
 

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The Americans with Disabilities Act makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against disabled individuals. To that end, the Act includes a provision that, prior to an actual offer of employment, an employer “shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.” The only inquiry that can be made is whether the applicant is able to perform job-related functions. In a case of first impression, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a non-disabled employee can sue an employer for prohibited medical inquiry under the ADA. Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 11th Cir., No. 08-16656, Jan. 11, 2010.

John Harrison was assigned as a temporary employee with Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc. (BEHI) in 2005, working to repair and test electronic boards. At that time, if a BEHI supervisor believed that a temporary employee would meet the company’s needs, he could invite that individual to submit an application for permanent employment, which required undergoing a drug test and background screening.

In May 2005, Harrison submitted an employment application to BEHI at the suggestion of his supervisor, Don Anthony, and underwent the required drug screening and background check. At that point, Harrison had never been informed of any performance deficiencies or problems with his work attitude. Harrison’s drug screening came back positive which, under BEHI’s policy, required review by a Medical Review Officer (MRO). Anthony was contacted by BEHI’s HR department and was asked to “send [Harrison] her way.” Although HR did not tell Anthony about the positive drug test, Anthony discovered that information on his own, and informed Harrison that the test had come back positive for barbiturates. Harrison stated that he had a prescription for the drug, and Anthony asked him to produce it. Anthony immediately called the MRO and passed the phone to Harrison. Anthony remained in the room while Harrison answered a series of questions from the MRO, explaining that he had been diagnosed with epilepsy at age two, and took barbiturates to control the effects of that disease.

Shortly afterward, Harrison was informed by the MRO that his drug test had been cleared. However, Anthony told HR not to prepare an offer letter for Harrison. He further asked the temporary agency not to return Harrison to BEHI, stating that Harrison had “performance and attitude problems.” Harrison immediately was fired from the agency.

Harrison filed a lawsuit against BEHI under the ADA, alleging that the company had engaged in improper medical inquiry. BEHI moved for summary judgment which was granted by the district court. That decision was reversed by the 11th Circuit on appeal. The primary basis for the reversal was the appellate court’s answer to the question of whether a non-disabled individual can state a private cause of action for a prohibited medical inquiry under the ADA. (The EEOC had determined that Harrison’s epilepsy did not rise to the level of “disability” under the ADA. Although the 11th Circuit had not previously addressed that issue, it held – consistently with sister circuits which have specifically addressed that question – that the ADA precludes inquiries with respect to any applicant who has not yet received a job offer, whether or not the individual is disabled under the ADA.

This case raises an interesting issue. The ADA specifically recognizes an exemption for pre-employment drug tests (“a test to determine the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered a medical examination”), and allows an employer to validate the test results by asking about lawful drug use or possible explanations for the positive result other than illegal use of drugs. However, as this case makes clear, disability-related questions are prohibited. In fact, the Court in this case quotes the legislative history of the ADA to point out that the drug-test exemption “should not conflict with the right of individuals who take drugs under medical supervision not to disclose their medical condition before a conditional offer of employment has been given.” Therefore, while an employer may conduct follow-up questions in response to a positive drug test, there are specific limitations on the types of information that can be elicited by someone other than a medical officer. While BEHI’s procedure to have an MRO conduct follow-up questioning may have been consistent with the ADA, Anthony’s presence during Harrison’s responses and revelation of his medical condition was held by this Court to preclude summary judgment in favor of the company.
 

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A former editorial writer for the Indianapolis Star who claimed that she lost her job because of her “traditional” Christian beliefs regarding homosexuality was unable to support claims of religious discrimination under Title VII, because she could not show that she met the legitimate business expectations of her employer. Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 7th Cir., No. 08-2050, December 8, 2009.

Linda Coffey worked as an editorial writer for The Indianapolis Star and claims that she left the newspaper as a victim of employment discrimination. Coffey alleged that she was discriminated against because she is a Christian who believes that homosexual conduct is sinful. After she filed a lawsuit, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the newspaper. That ruling was affirmed on appeal to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. (Note that Coffey filed her lawsuit along with another Star employee, James Patterson, who claimed age, race, and religious discrimination. His claim was dismissed, as well.)

The Indianapolis Star is that state’s largest newspaper. In 2003, Dennis Ryerson was named as the Star’s editor and vice president, and was responsible for newsroom staffing and editorial content. In that same year, Ryerson and Coffey, who was a member of the editorial department at the time, engaged in an e-mail exchange related to an editorial proposed by Coffey on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy protects adults engaging in private, consensual homosexual activity. Coffey, who describes herself as a “traditional Christian,” proposed an editorial that described, in graphic detail, HIV risks associated with such activity. Although Ryerson refused to publish that column, he said that he was open to publishing a less graphic column on the risks of unprotected sex. That refusal triggered an e-mail exchange that Ryerson perceived as an attempt by Coffey at workplace proselytizing, which he warned Coffey was inappropriate.

During this same period, Coffey had developed a habit of violating the Star’s overtime policy by failing to have her overtime pre-approved. Although she was warned of this violation, Coffey continued to do extra work without pre-approval, often submitting hours that were viewed by the paper as “excessive and unnecessary.” In September 2003, administrative oversight for the Star’s internship program was transferred from Coffey to the newsroom editor, leaving Coffey with a less than full-time position. Although Ryerson offered Coffey a full-time position on the copy-desk, Coffey preferred editorial writing and resigned rather than transfer. On her last day at the Star, Coffey sent an e-mail stating that she had “enjoyed and appreciated” her work on the paper. However, in her lawsuit, Coffey claimed that the proposed transfer to the copy department was an adverse action, based on religious discrimination.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of Coffey’s claims, stating that Coffey could not show that she met the Star’s legitimate performance expectations, because the undisputed evidence showed that Coffey continually had violated the paper’s overtime policy. Further, to the extent that Coffey claimed that Ryerson would have permitted someone who did not share Coffey’s religious views to remain in the editorial department notwithstanding violation of company rules, Coffey failed to show that a similarly situated employee (an editorial writer who repeatedly violated overtime rules) who did not hold her same religious beliefs (that homosexual conduct is “sinful”) was treated more favorably and, therefore, Coffey was unable to support her prima facie case of religious discrimination. Moreover, Coffey’s claim of “constructive discharge” was belied by her final e-mail, which expressed no complaint or concerns.

While claims of religious discrimination should be taken seriously by employers, such claims do not overshadow an employee’s duty to meet legitimate job responsibilities. In order to effectively establish the defense asserted by the Star in this case, an employer should have a written job description that sets forth the responsibilities of the employees. In addition, clear, objective, and complete records of the individual employee’s performance should be made and kept by the employer, in order to support the assertion that the employee has not met the employer’s legitimate expectations. In this case, documentation of meeting and warnings associated with Coffey’s violation of the overtime policy was critical in establishing Coffey's failure to meet her employer’s expectations.
 

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In October 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued final guidelines, which became effective on December 1, 2009, regarding the use of “endorsements and testimonials” in advertising. “Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising,” 16 CFR Part 255. Under those guidelines, employees who use social media like blogs or Facebook to make statements about their employers’ products may create unintended legal liability for their employers if a consumer later claims to have been misled into purchasing an allegedly dangerous or defective product by such a posting.

Under the guidelines, the FTC defines an “endorsement” as an advertising message that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than a sponsoring advertiser. An endorsement must not include any representation that would be deceptive if made directly by the sponsoring advertiser. Further, the guidelines specifically state that companies are subject to liability for false or unsubstantiated statements made through endorsements, or for failing to disclose material connections between themselves and their endorsers. Importantly, the guidelines impose liability on endorsers and companies who fail to disclose “material connections” between an endorser and the company about whose products that endorser comments.

Therefore an employee who uses electronic media, including e-mail, blogs, or social networking sites, to make comments about a product made by his or her employer, and who fails to disclose his or her relationship with that manufacturer may create legal liability under the FTC guidelines. Further, should a consumers rely on a particular comment in that posting to his or her detriment, any ensuing damage could be attributed to the manufacturer/company.

A clearly written, widely distributed, and consistently enforced social media policy can help to avoid liability for violation of these FTC guidelines. Because the guidelines are designed to protect consumers against misleading advertising and endorsements, a company’s written directive to its employees to avoid publishing “endorsements” that are misleading or in which the employee’s relationship to the company is not revealed can help to avoid legal liability.

While the FTC’s own comments to the guidelines include a statement that the Commission would be “unlikely” to take action against a company for the conduct of a single “rogue” employee who violates a company’s social media policy via an illegal endorsement, that comment remains to be tested. Should a non-compliant endorsement create broad consumer injury or damage, the endorser’s employer may find that it cannot escape associated liability under the new guidelines. While guidelines themselves do not have the same force that a statute does, courts view them as an indication of how a law should be interpreted, and often act consistently with them.

Employers should review their written social media policies, and should assure that its employees are aware of the fact that the company has a concern and an interest in employees’ comments about company products. Further, employers should take action when an employee acts in violation of an applicable social media policy, in order to insure its own credibility during a review of the situation by the FTC.
 

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