Assignment to a lesser position upon return from leave may support FMLA interference claim.

The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of an employer, holding that a plaintiff’s testimony and evidence related to her transfer to a position of less responsibility upon return from Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave created an issue of material fact that required a jury to determine whether the employer had interfered with the employee’s FMLA leave.  Rodriguez v. University of Miami Hospital, 11th Cir., No. 11-15206, December 3, 2012.

Iliana Rodriguez requested and was granted FMLA leave from her administrative position at the University of Miami Hospital.  Upon her return from leave, Rodriguez met with a number of individuals, including her supervisor, Francetta Allen, and the Hospital’s Executive Director of Human Resources, Errol Douglas.  At that meeting, it was determined that Rodriguez would be transferred to a temporary position, based on her admitted inability to get along with Allen.  While the temporary position was at the same level of pay and benefits, the new position had significantly less responsibility and, in fact, consisted largely of copying documents.  Six weeks after being transferred to that position, Rodriguez was fired.  She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that the Hospital interfered with her right to reinstatement under the FMLA by failing to return her to her original position, and then fired her in retaliation for taking such leave.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on both claims.

In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the summary judgment on Rodriguez’s retaliation claim, holding that there no evidence that the Hospital’s reasons for the termination – that Rodriguez could not get along with her supervisor, and was unable to find another acceptable job within the Hospital – were false.  Rodriguez therefore could not show a causal nexus between her FMLA leave and her firing, and her retaliation claim was dismissed.

However, an FMLA interference claim is analyzed differently than a retaliation claim.  According to the Eleventh Circuit, if an employee is not reinstated to the same or an equivalent position, the employer bears the ultimate burden of proving that its action was taken for independent reasons that were unrelated to the employee’s leave.  Therefore, in this case, the Court had to determine whether there was any genuine issue of material fact regarding the Hospital’s defense that it had transferred Rodriguez to the temporary, lesser position for reasons unrelated to Rodriguez’s FMLA leave.

An employer is not liable for failing to reinstate an employee to her former position if the employer can show that the employee cannot perform the essential functions of her original position.  Further, in that instance, an employer is not obligated or required to restore the employee to any other position.  In this case, the Hospital argued that it transferred Rodriguez upon her return from leave because she was unable to perform the essential functions of her original position, which included being able to get along with her supervisor, Francetta Allen.  Had the record unquestionably established that Rodriguez and Allen could not work together, the Hospital would have met its burden that the transfer was “wholly unrelated” to Rodriguez’s FMLA leave, and the interference claim could have been dismissed.

However, based on deposition testimony and a lack of documentary evidence that Rodriguez and Allen had been unable to get along prior to the FMLA leave, the Court was able to find disputed issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment in favor of the Hospital.  Contrary to the Hospital’s assertion that Rodriguez was unable and unwilling to work with Allen, Rodriguez testified that she had asked for the meeting with Allen and Douglas upon her return from leave in order to “address whatever issue was there” and to move on, as she did not want to lose her job. 

In addition, in spite of the Hospital’s statement that Rodriguez’s issues with Allen pre-dated her return from FMLA leave, there was no documentary evidence of any performance deficiencies or difficulties between Rodriguez and Allen until the meeting held at the time of Rodriguez’s return.  Indeed, Allen first documented her issues with Rodriguez in an e-mail sent to Douglas one hour before that meeting.  Because there are disputed issues of material fact underlying the Hospital’s defenses against Rodriguez’s interference claim, the Court determined that it is for a jury to decide whether those defenses constitute an honest explanation of the reason that Rodriguez was not returned to her position upon returning from FMLA leave.  The Court remanded the case to the district court for further action on that issue.

This case is another in a series of recent federal court cases in which a court points out an important difference between the analysis of an FMLA retaliation claim and an FMLA interference claim for purposes of summary judgment.  In a retaliation claim, the ultimate burden of proof is on the employee – under the oft-cited McDonnell-Douglas 3-step shifting burden analysis - to show that an employer’s reason for its action is simply a pretext for retaliation.  However, in an interference claim, the ultimate burden is on the employer to prove its defense that its action was based on independent reasons that were unrelated to the employee’s FMLA leave, and to prove it without any question of material fact.  In this case, the Hospital was unable to carry that burden, and the matter will be returned to the lower court in order to allow a jury to decide the issue.

 

Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliatory motive

In an unpublished opinion, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reminds us that whether a case is based on allegations of discrimination or on allegations of retaliation, the individual bringing the lawsuit carries the ultimate burden of proof in the case. Sunderman v. Westar Energy, Inc., 10th Cir., No. 08-3059, Jan. 14, 2009.

To establish retaliation under Title VII, an individual’s evidence must withstand the three-part analysis established by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that test, the plaintiff first bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and that action. Once the individual meets that burden, the employer must offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its employment action. Should the employer satisfy this burden, the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the employer’s reason is “unworthy of credence” so that a fact-finder could infer that the employer did not act for those reasons but instead, for some retaliatory reason.

Derek Sunderman was employed as a manager by Westar Energy, Inc., a public utility company. In March 2002, Sunderman made a complaint to Westar’s HR department regarding certain allegedly offensive sexual comments made by a supervisor, and followed up in October of that year with a written complaint to his own supervisor (Olsen). He then filed a claim with the KHRC and the EEOC, alleging that Westar retaliated against him - by reducing his compensation and suspending him in late October - for making the complaints.

During a 2002-2003 reorganization which was in process prior to Sunderman’s complaints, Westar eliminated a number of positions, including Sunderman’s, and transferred the responsibilities of those positions to the company’s Customer Support Group. Sunderman was referred to the company’s Career Placement Center, and his employment was terminated in August 2003. He then brought a lawsuit against Westar, alleging that his employment there was terminated in retaliation for filing a complaint to the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the EEOC in November 2002. Westar countered that Sunderman’s discharge was based upon the reorganization and was strictly a business decision. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Westar. That decision was upheld on appeal to the Tenth Circuit.

The dismissal of Sunderman’s claims was based primarily on the fact that he had provided insufficient evidence showing a causal connection between (1) his complaint to Olsen and/or the filing of his complaint with the KHRC/EEOC, and (2) his termination. The facts showed that Olsen was not a decision-maker in the reorganization or with respect to Sunderman’s ultimate termination. While some cases of retaliation rest upon a “cat’s paw” theory, where a biased individual who lacks decision-making power uses a formal decision-maker as a “dupe” in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action, Sunderman presented no evidence that Olsen suggested either the reorganization or the subsequent discharge. While the Tenth Circuit determined that the employment actions taken against Sunderman in 2002 (reduction in compensation and a suspension) could be raised by Sunderman as background evidence for the retaliation claim, it also determined that Westar had provided sufficient evidence of its business-related decision regarding Sunderman, and that those two incidents were “insufficient . . . to raise a jury question on the causation and pretext issues that are associated with plaintiff’s [August 2003] termination.”

It is clear that in this case, the company’s documentation of the business reasons for its actions were a primary focus of the court’s analysis and review. Although Sunderman had the ultimate burden of proof in this case, the company’s ability to support its own defense with evidence and testimony was sufficient to refute Sunderman’s claims. Once again, objective and complete documentation of a company’s business decision is integral to a favorable result in a claim related to that decision.