Back pay award in successful retaliation claim against former employer may be based upon position not awarded by a different employer.

It is generally understood that employees can bring Title VII claims – and be awarded damages - for hostile environment, wrongful termination, and retaliation. What is less clearly understood is the extent of the economic damages for which a former employer may be liable in the situation in which a litigant claims to have lost a job opportunity because of a retaliatory action on the part of that former employer. The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently answered that question by quoting the wording of Title VII, and holding that the law “does not require that the employer liable for back pay be the same entity for whom the plaintiff would have worked had he not suffered unlawful retaliation.” Nassar v. Univ. of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, 5th Cir., No. 11-10338, 3/8/12.

Naiel Nassar, a U.S. citizen since 1990, was born in Egypt and attended medical school there. He subsequently did a medical residency and a fellowship in infectious diseases at the University of California, Davis. In 2001, Nassar was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) as an Assistant Professor of infectious disease medicine. Part of Nassar’s duties required that he provide patient care at Parkland Hospital’s Amelia Court clinic, an outpatient HIV/AIDS clinic affiliated with UTSW.

In 2004, UTSW hired Dr. Beth Levine as the chief of its infectious disease program. In that role, Levine directed that Nassar begin billing for the services he provided to the HIV clinic. Nassar objected to the directive, arguing that his salary for clinical services was fully funded by a federal grant, and stating that billing the patients therefore would be “double dipping.” Nassar claimed that Levine then began to “harass” him, making derogatory statement about his race and his Muslim religion, including one comment that “middle easterners were lazy.” His allegations were supported by a clinical supervisor, whose affidavit described a “disconnect between Dr. Levine’s [derogatory] statements and the reality of Dr. Nassar’s work.” Based on his concerns about Levine, Nassar ultimately applied for direct employment by Parkland Health & Hospital System in 2006. Parkland made preparations to hire Nassar, drafting a letter offering a staff physician job to Nassar. However, the offer was later withdrawn. Nassar contended - and testimony supported the claim - that UTSW retaliated against him by blocking the offer from Parkland because Nassar stated in his resignation letter that his primary reason for leaving UTSW was Levine’s harassment and discriminatory comments. Nassar ultimately accepted a job in a smaller clinic in Fresno, California, and filed a lawsuit against UTSW in federal court alleging discrimination/constructive discharge and retaliation.

At trial, the jury was presented with only two questions: (1) Whether Nassar was constructively discharged because of his race, national origin, or religious preference; and (2) Whether UTSW retaliated against Nassar by blocking or objecting to his employment by Parkland after Nassar complained about his treatment at UTSW. After one hour of deliberations, the jury answered “Yes” to both questions. Two days after the May 24, 2010 verdict, the same jury awarded $3.2 Million in compensatory damages and $438,000 in lost back pay to Nassar. The trial court reduced the compensatory damage award to $300,000 under the Title VII damage cap, but added nearly $500,000 in attorney fees and costs to Nassar’s award. Both sides appealed the awards.

Upon review, the Fifth Circuit reversed the verdict against UTSW on Nassar’s constructive discharge claim, holding that while the evidence that Nassar provided to the jury may have supported a claim of hostile environment, that evidence did not rise to the level of egregious conduct necessary to support a claim of constructive discharge. However, the Court upheld the jury’s verdict on the retaliation claim, and further upheld the method used by the jury to calculate Nassar's lost income.

While UTSW argued that Nassar’s lost income should have been the difference between that which he was earning at UTSW ($166,395 as an Assistant Professor) and his subsequent compensation in California (which varied from $165,000 to $180,000 a year, including benefits), the district court allowed the jury to calculate the lost pay by comparing Nassar’s prospective income from Parkland ($240,500 a year, including benefits) to the amount that he was earning in California. Using that method, the jury awarded Nassar $436,167.66 in lost back pay. The Fifth Circuit upheld that award because it made Nassar whole by placing him in the position that he would have been in “but for” the retaliation.

This case is a strong reminder that unlawful retaliation can take the form of a former employer preventing an individual from getting a job with another employer. Under Title VII, lost income is payable by the employer responsible for the unlawful employment practice, and may be calculated as the difference between the individual’s former pay, and that which he would have earned had the retaliation not occurred.  If, as in this case, evidence indicates that the retaliation kept the individual from moving to a more highly lucrative position, the former employer risks being liable for the loss of a substantially higher wage.

In addition, employers – especially hospital and healthcare entities that are contemplating direct hiring of physicians - should understand that an employee, or former employee, can successfully prove retaliation without having successfully proven discrimination or a constructive discharge claim, and that damages for lost pay and benefits for highly compensated individuals can be substantial.
 

Constructive discharge claim requires "intolerable" conditions.

The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld summary judgment against a bank teller who claimed that she was constructively discharged when she left her job on the last day of her pregnancy-related medical leave. Trierweiler v. Wells Fargo bank, 8th Cir., No. 10-1343, April 8, 2011.

An individual can support a claim of constructive discharge by demonstrating that a reasonable person would have found the employment conditions intolerable, and that the employer either intended to force that person to quit, or could reasonable have foreseen that she would do so. Kimberli Trierweiler began working for Wells Fargo Bank in October 2006 as a teller in the bank’s Watertown, South Dakota branch. The handbook that Trierweiler received at the outset of her employment indicated a “regular and dependable attendance” was an essential function of her job, and that excessive absences from work would lead to discipline, up to and including termination. The handbook also provided methods for reporting employment issues, including concerns related to accommodations for medical issues.

Bank employees received 160 hours (20 days) of paid time off (PTO) each year, and could exercise that time off after 30 days of employment. Between her start date and the end of 2006, Trierwetler used her pro rata allotment of PTO, along with four and a half unpaid additional days of absence.

In December 2006, Trierweiler informed her supervisors that she was pregnant. Although she was not eligible for Family and Medical Leave (not having worked for the Bank for the requisite one year), she would have been entitled to maternity leave under a short-term disability plan, which had a 5-day “waiting period” during which Trierweiler would have had to use PTO days or unpaid leave.

By mid-April 2007, Trierweiler had used eleven and a half days of PTO, with three additional days scheduled before the end of April, amounting to 120 hours of her available 160 hours of PTO for 2007. None of that time was related to her pregnancy. During a meeting with her supervisor at that point, Trierweier was warned about her frequent absences.

On May 9, Trierweiler took another PTO day to stay home with a sick child. Following that, Trierweiler was told that if she had another absence, she would receive a written warning. On May 14, Trierweiler left a phone message for her supervisor, stating that her doctor had prescribed a week of pregnancy-related medical leave. According to Trierweiler, her supervisor responded with a message that said that “This isn’t going to work, you taking time off.” Trierweiler did not have any further direct contact with her supervisor or any HR person on the issue, but testified in her subsequent lawsuit that she felt that the message meant that she no longer had a job.

While Trierweiler was on her medical leave, her supervisor sought advice from HR. It was decided that Trierweiler should receive a written warning for her previous absences (not including the current leave), but that a company program, called “WorkAbility” would be explored for temporary accommodations for the current and any future pregnancy-related leaves. Two days later, on the final day of her week-long leave, Trierweiler drove through the bank’s drive-through lane, handed her keys to the teller, and stated that she was “done.” She followed this with a phone message to her supervisor that she had done so, and asked for her personal office items.

Trierweiler brought a federal court action under Title VII’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act, claiming that she had been constructively discharged. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, and that decision was upheld by the Eighth Circuit. In spite of Trierweiler’s argument that an alleged statement by her supervisor - that she couldn’t miss additional work without being fired – was designed to force her to quit, the Eighth Circuit pointed to the company’s decision to seek assistance from WorkAbility to explore possible accommodations for the situation. According to the Court, this showed an intent to maintain an employment relationship with Trierweiler, not an attempt to force her to quit, or to create an intolerable condition that would make it impossible for her to continue to work there.

Trierweiler never spoke with HR, utilized any resources provided in the handbook for problem resolution, or asked for clarification of any of the phone messages left for her about her absences. As such, Trierweiler failed to provide an opportunity for the company to remedy the issues of which she was complaining. The lesson here is that Court’s are hesitant to find constructive discharge when an employee does not allow the employer a reasonable chance to work out the problem. Further, the Bank’s efforts to find a resolution to the problem, and its documentation of that effort, helped to successfully defend against this claim.