Ostracism and petty mistreatments may collectively rise to the level of hostile work environment.

A female plumber on “light duty” in the City of Chicago’s Department of Sewers filed a lawsuit alleging that because she was female, her supervisor assigned menial work to her, prohibited her coworkers from interacting with her, and subjected her to alleged “verbal violence.” While the district court viewed each of those actions individually and found that none constituted hostile work environment under Title VII, the7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s summary judgment in favor of the City, and determined that the case should move forward to trial, on the basis that a jury could find that the collective treatment could rise to the level of hostile environment. Anna M. Hall v. City of Chicago, 7th Cir., No. 11-3279, March 29, 2013.

In 1999, Anna Hall, a plumber for the City of Chicago, began a lengthy disability leave due to a work-related injury. Hall returned to work in 2003 with a 25-pound lifting restriction, and was unable to resume working as a plumber. The City then assigned Hall to light duty in the House Drain Inspectors Division of the City’s Department of Sewers, where she was supervised by Gregory Johnson, the Division supervisor. Johnson assigned Hall to alphabetize various files for several weeks and, in fact, gave her the same files over and over again. A few weeks later, Johnson did the same with reviews of drainpipe videos, on which Hall took notes which were never read – as Johnson already had reviewed the videos and taken his own notes prior to having Hall undertake the task. After several weeks, Hall complained to the department’s personnel director about the assignments, who dismissed the complaints and allegedly called Hall a “trouble maker” in the process.

In addition to assigning the menial work, Johnson prohibited the other Division employees from speaking to Hall, ultimately excluding her from meetings, and precluding her from taking on additional responsibilities within the group. Johnson also directed anger towards Hall in other ways, making comments – overheard by Hall – that he “could slap that woman and get a promotion” and that he might “go postal on that woman.” On one occasion early in 2004, Johnson purposely bumped into Hall, after which Hall contacted the police, the union, and her lawyer, and ultimately filed a Violence in the Workplace Report with the City. Eight days after that Report, a written reprimand was issued to Johnson.

Hall continued to do the assignments given to her by Johnson until 2005, when she left the Division and filed a lawsuit, alleging that Johnson discriminated and retaliated against her, and that the City failed to promote her in retaliation for her complaints. The lower court entered summary judgment against Hall, dismissing the complaint. On appeal, Hall pursued only her hostile work environment claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that claim.

Title VII makes it unlawful to treat an employee differently because of a protected characteristic, including gender. To survive summary judgment on her Title VII hostile work environment claim, Hall had to provide evidence that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive, that the hostile conditions were because of her sex, and that the company should be held liable for Johnson’s actions. The Seventh Circuit determined that Hall had done all three.

First, the Court stated that it was improper to “carve up the incidents of harassment and then separately analyze each incident, by itself, to see if each rises to the level of being severe or pervasive.” Instead, the Seventh Circuit looked at the totality of the circumstances and found that a jury could conclude that Johnson’s ongoing conduct was designed to ostracize Hall from the rest of the Division.

Next, while admitting that this was a “close” case, the Court found enough evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that Johnson was motivated by Hall’s gender. That evidence consisted largely of Johnson’s references to “that woman” in his remarks about Hall. It is of note that Hall was not the only woman in the Division - Johnson’s secretary also was female. However, the Court pointed out the fact that Hall was in a “traditionally male role” (that of plumber), while the secretary was not, and referred to research on gender stereotyping.

Third, Hall was able to proffer sufficient evidence on which a jury could base a finding of liability against the City. While the City took prompt action after Hall’s Violence in the Workplace Report, the record also showed that Hall first raise her concerns about her assignments a few weeks into her light duty position, but allegedly was met with the statement that Hall was a “trouble maker.” Further, Hall’s report to the union and to the police of the bumping incident in 2004 provided sufficient notice to the City of the issues related to Johnson’s actions.

It is important to understand that the Seventh Circuit’s holding is not an ultimate determination of Hall’s hostile environment claim. However, it does indicate that courts are likely to: (1) view hostile work environment complaints through a broad lens, looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether behavior is “severe or pervasive”; (2) interpret remarks that include references to gender (“that woman”) as an indication that the remark was made because of the sex of the person being mentioned; and (3) assume that a jury may find a company liable if prior complaints have been made without some active response. In addition, the case is a warning to employers regarding the supervision of individuals on “light duty” and a directive to assure that company anti-discrimination policies are enforced for those employees, even though they are in positions other than their own.
 

Employer has no obligation to provide "light duty" assignment under FMLA or ADA.

The use of light duty assignments to employees who are returning to work after recuperation from an illness or injury is an often used mechanism. The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that neither the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) nor the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) creates an obligation for an employer to provide light duty work to an individual who is unable – with or without accommodation – to return to the essential functions of his job. James v. Hyatt Regency Chicago, 7th Cir., No. 1:09-cv-07873, February 13, 2013.

Carris James began his employment with the Hyatt Regency Chicago in 1985 as a banquet steward, responsible for maintaining the cleanliness of banquet and food service areas, which included lifting pots and pans, and transporting trash containers around those areas. At that time, James informed Hyatt of his vision problem, which was correctable with eyeglasses and magnifying glasses. Hyatt accommodated James by increasing the print size of his work assignments and schedule.

In March 2007, James was punched in the eye during a non-work-related incident, and developed aretinal detachment for which he underwent surgery in the following month. When Hyatt’s human resources department learned that James’ absence was related to a medical issue, it  provided information to James regardingFMLA leave. On April 24, 2007, James’ physician, Dr. Scott, stated that James could return to “light duty” on May 10, but did not say for how long James would require that light duty assignment. On April 25, James requested FMLA leave, which was applied retroactively to include James’ prior absences.

On May 9, 2007, James provided to Hyatt additional paperwork that indicated that James was “unable to work in any capacity.” James subsequently received disability benefits based upon that information. In addition, on May 11, James submitted a medical certification to Hyatt stating that his condition could possibly lead to permanent incapacity.

James’ 12 weeks of FMLA ended on July 13, 2007, but the collective bargaining agreement between the union and Hyatt provided job-protected leave for up to one year from his original absence. In August, James submitted various paperwork to Hyatt, including one release that stated that he could return to work although “visually impaired,” and others in which Dr. Scott continued to represent that James was incapable of working in any capacity.

On September 25, James faxed a note to Hyatt from yet another doctor who stated that James could return to work with lifting and bending restrictions, which would have precluded James from returning to the steward position. Following that, Hyatt attempted to contact James seeking additional information, but no clarification was provided until January 2008, when Hyatt’s Workers Compensation and Safety Manager sent a letter directly to Dr. Scott, enclosing a return to work certification form, as well as a job analysis for the banquet steward position. Dr. Scott responded, stating that James could return to work, but could not complete any task that required better than 20/200 vision. Hyatt then met with James and scheduled a return to work in the same position, shift, and seniority level as before James’ medical leave.
 

In 2009, James filed a lawsuit, claiming that Hyatt had interfered with his FMLA leave and had discriminated against him under the ADA by failing to allow him to return to work on light duty in May 2007. The lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Hyatt on both claims was upheld by the Seventh Circuit on appeal.

First, the Court quoted the language of the FMLA and stated that “if an employee cannot perform an essential function of [his] original position because of a physical or mental condition, the employee has no right to restoration to a different position under the FMLA.” While the FMLA requires an employer to restore an employee to the position held at the time the FMLA leave began, or to an “equivalent” position, that law does not require an employer to restore an employee to a light duty (which clearly is not an equivalent) position simply to allow him or her to return prior to the expiration of the leave time allowed.

Next, the Court addressed James’ ADA claim that Hyatt had failed to accommodate him by pointing out that Hyatt had accommodated James’ visual impairment throughout James’ employment, beginning in 1985. It also pointed out that the “conditional” and, at times, contradictory releases being provided by James, along with the application for disability benefits which stated that James was unable to work in any capacity, did not provide information to Hyatt sufficient for the company to understand the true nature of James’ condition, or to formulate or implement a reasonable accommodation.

This case provides a road map to employers faced with the increasingly frequent situation in which there are both FMLA and ADA issues. First, once the company learned that James’ absence was medically related, it provided FMLA paperwork. During James’ leave, Hyatt requested medical updates in an attempt to understand if and when James could return to work, and to determine the extent of his medical impairment. When those updates were not forthcoming, and rather than make assumptions based on contradictory reports, Hyatt requested - directly from the medical provider - clarification of James’ medical condition, and included return-to-work certification forms as well as a detailed job description to allow the doctor to determine whether James could return to his position with or without accommodation under the ADA. It was the company’s action that ultimately led to James’ return to his position, and the company’s considered and persistent attention to the issues that led to a successful result in this case.
 

Employer not obligated to make an otherwise temporary "light-duty" position permanent to accommodate disabled employee under the ADA.

In an unpublished opinion, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld summary judgment in favor of an employer who refused to convert a light-duty position into a permanent job for a disabled employee.  Wardia v. Campbell County Regional Justice Dept. of Corrections, 6th Cir., No. 12-5337, January 3, 2013. In that case, a juvenile detention center employee who was unable to engage in the physical actions related to restraining juveniles in the facility was discharged, in spite of the fact that he asserted his ability to continue to work indefinitely in a light-duty position into which he had been placed on a temporary basis.

John Wardia became employed as a Youth Worker at the Campbell County, Kentucky, Juvenile Detention Center in 2003.  In that position, Wardia supervised and monitored the activities of juveniles committed to the facility, assisted with their “interpersonal skill development,” and engaged in various administrative tasks.  Youth workers are required to undergo a three-month long “safe-physical-management-skills” training upon hire, and participate in additional training on a monthly basis.  While physical restraint actions are not frequent, the written job description of the Youth Worker position lists the ability to perform physical restraints on juveniles as an essential function of the position.

In or around 2008, Wardia underwent surgery for a non-work-related neck injury.  Because his condition prevented him from performing physical restraint actions on the juveniles, Wardia requested, and was granted, the temporary accommodation of working in the detention center’s control room upon his return to work after surgery.  Subsequently, Wardia’s physician provided information that Wardia’s condition would be permanent, and Wardia was placed on leave without pay on October 18, 2009, to be considered as having resigned if he could not return to work within a one-year period.

Two weeks prior to the expiration of that one-year period, Wardia requested permanent assignment to the control room position to which he previously had been assigned as light-duty, asking for that assignment as a reasonable accommodation for his disability.  After a pre-termination hearing, the County’s Department of Juvenile Justice decided against making the assignment on a permanent basis, and issued a final notice of termination to Wardia.  Wardia filed a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination, and arguing that the restraint of juveniles was not, in fact, an essential function of the Youth Worker position, since it was rarely necessary for employees to restrain the juveniles.  Further, Wardia argued that even if that function was determined to be essential, the permanent assignment to the control room was reasonable.

The lower court disagreed with Wardia’s assertions, and granted the County’s motion for summary judgment.  That decision was upheld by the Sixth Circuit, who made two notable holdings: (1) in assessing the “essential function” designation of an activity that is rarely performed, a court will look to the seriousness of the consequences of non-performance; and (2) temporary light-duty positions established for recuperating employees need not be converted into permanent positions.

In Wardia’s circumstance, the court determined that the ability to perform physical restraints on the juveniles was, in fact, essential.  The potential for physical confrontation exists on a daily basis at the facility, and a staff member who is unable to restrain a juvenile may subject him-or herself and the facility to liability from injured employees or juveniles.  Wardia’s assertion that certain workers needed assistance with the restraint function was unconvincing to the Court, which stated that “Simply because some employees more often and more capably perform a certain function does not make it any less essential for everyone else.”  Because Wardia was unable to disprove the “essential” nature of the physical retraint function, the Court proceeded to address the question of whether Wardia’s request for accommodation was reasonable.

Reasonable accommodation analysis under the ADA requires that a plaintiff propose an accommodation that is objectively reasonable, thereby shifting the burden to his or her employer to prove that the request is unreasonable under the specific facts.  Wardia made two requests: to work all functions other than the physical restraint function, which would have to be handled by co-workers; and permanent assignment to the light-duty control room position.  The Sixth Circuit held that neither was reasonable.  First, it determined that the need for assistance with the essential physical restraint function is not reasonable because the ADA does not require employers to accommodate individuals by shifting an essential job function to others.  Any other approach would render the “essential function” step of the analysis as meaningless.  Second, the Court held that permanent assignment to a light-duty or rotating position is not reasonable, as it would shift Wardia’s essential job functions to others, leaving his co-workers with the physical restraint functions, as well as his direct juvenile contact functions.  The Court, citing a prior Sixth Circuit decision, found that temporary light-duty positions for recuperating employees need not be converted into permanent positions. To hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the ADA.

While this case arguably assists employers in an often difficult situation of whether to return an employee to work after a lengthy medical-related absence, the fact that the employer in this case was a juvenile detention facility and that the safety of residents and employees was one of the factors in the essential nature of the function at issue may have had a role in the ultimate decision. Employers should react carefully when faced with similar circumstances, and should thoroughly and objectively evaluate whether a function is actually essential.  However the Court’s decision regarding the necessity for making a temporary light-duty position into a permanent role is more universally applicable, and can be considered - again, with objective rationale and documented reasoning - in most circumstances.