By: Ogletree Deakins

Under Title VII, an unlawful employment practice is established when an employee demonstrates that gender is a motivating factor for an adverse employment action. Under that analysis, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Title VII claims of a female hotel desk clerk who was fired after a company decision-maker complained that the employee lacked the pretty and “Midwestern girl” look desirable in a front desk employee. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C., 8th Cir., No. 08-3860, Jan. 21, 2010.

Brenna Lewis began working for Heartland Inns of America in July 2005, starting out as a night auditor. In that job, Lewis worked the front desk from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., doing it well enough to receive two merit-based pay raises and positive customer feedback.

In December 2006, Lewis’ manager, Lori Stifel, received permission over the telephone from the company’s Director of Operations, Barbara Cullinan, to offer to Lewis a daytime (7 a.m. to 3 p.m.) shift position on the front desk. Lewis accepted, and took over that position at the end of December. Although Cullinan initially had approved Lewis’ move to the day shift, her attitude changed after she met Lewis in person. At that point, Cullinan told Stipel that she wasn’t sure that Lewis was a “good fit” for the position, as Lewis lacked the “Midwestern girl” look that Cullinan felt was necessary at the front desk. By her own admission, Lewis is “slightly more masculine,” avoids makeup, and wears mens’ button down shirts and slacks. She has been mistaken for a male, and has been referred to as “tomboyish.” However, while Cullinan felt that front desk staff should be “pretty,” the front desk job description in Heartland’s personnel manual does not mention appearance.

Cullinan ordered Stifel to return Lewis to the overnight shift. When Stifel refused, Cullinan insisted that Stifel resign. Cullinan then required Lewis to re-interview for the day shift position, even though Lewis had held the position successfully for over a month. Lew protested, but attended the interview. Three days later, Lewis was fired. In its termination letter, Heartland stated that Lewis was “hostile” toward company policies and had attempted the “thwart” the interview process. Lewis then filed a lawsuit, asserting that Heartland fired her for not confirming to sexual stereotypes, and claiming that such conduct violated Title VII. The lower court disagreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the company. On appeal, the 8th Circuit reversed that decision, holding that sexual stereotyping can violate Title VII when it influences employment decisions.

Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon sex. In this case, Lewis provided evidence that Heartland found her unsuited for her front desk job based, not upon her work performance, but upon an appearance that was inconsistent with the company’s preferred feminine stereotype. At the summary judgment phase of a case, the question is whether a plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could find that the individual was discriminated against because of her sex. Here, the 8th Circuit found that Cullinan’s remarks, along with her discharge of Stifel for not taking Lewis off the front desk, and her imposition of a second interview even after Lewis performed successfully in the position, clearly provided such evidence.

The line between sexual orientation – which is not yet prohibited by federal law – and discrimination “because of sex” can be difficult to draw. However, employers must recognize that an employer who takes an adverse action against an individual because he or she does not fit within sexual stereotypes is engaging in sex discrimination because that discrimination would not have occurred but for the individual’s sex. If a company’s disciplinary actions are meant to punish or belittle non-compliance with gender stereotypes, the actions may constitute a violation of Title VII’s “because of sex” provision.
 

The Americans with Disabilities Act makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against disabled individuals. To that end, the Act includes a provision that, prior to an actual offer of employment, an employer “shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.” The only inquiry that can be made is whether the applicant is able to perform job-related functions. In a case of first impression, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a non-disabled employee can sue an employer for prohibited medical inquiry under the ADA. Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 11th Cir., No. 08-16656, Jan. 11, 2010.

John Harrison was assigned as a temporary employee with Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc. (BEHI) in 2005, working to repair and test electronic boards. At that time, if a BEHI supervisor believed that a temporary employee would meet the company’s needs, he could invite that individual to submit an application for permanent employment, which required undergoing a drug test and background screening.

In May 2005, Harrison submitted an employment application to BEHI at the suggestion of his supervisor, Don Anthony, and underwent the required drug screening and background check. At that point, Harrison had never been informed of any performance deficiencies or problems with his work attitude. Harrison’s drug screening came back positive which, under BEHI’s policy, required review by a Medical Review Officer (MRO). Anthony was contacted by BEHI’s HR department and was asked to “send [Harrison] her way.” Although HR did not tell Anthony about the positive drug test, Anthony discovered that information on his own, and informed Harrison that the test had come back positive for barbiturates. Harrison stated that he had a prescription for the drug, and Anthony asked him to produce it. Anthony immediately called the MRO and passed the phone to Harrison. Anthony remained in the room while Harrison answered a series of questions from the MRO, explaining that he had been diagnosed with epilepsy at age two, and took barbiturates to control the effects of that disease.

Shortly afterward, Harrison was informed by the MRO that his drug test had been cleared. However, Anthony told HR not to prepare an offer letter for Harrison. He further asked the temporary agency not to return Harrison to BEHI, stating that Harrison had “performance and attitude problems.” Harrison immediately was fired from the agency.

Harrison filed a lawsuit against BEHI under the ADA, alleging that the company had engaged in improper medical inquiry. BEHI moved for summary judgment which was granted by the district court. That decision was reversed by the 11th Circuit on appeal. The primary basis for the reversal was the appellate court’s answer to the question of whether a non-disabled individual can state a private cause of action for a prohibited medical inquiry under the ADA. (The EEOC had determined that Harrison’s epilepsy did not rise to the level of “disability” under the ADA. Although the 11th Circuit had not previously addressed that issue, it held – consistently with sister circuits which have specifically addressed that question – that the ADA precludes inquiries with respect to any applicant who has not yet received a job offer, whether or not the individual is disabled under the ADA.

This case raises an interesting issue. The ADA specifically recognizes an exemption for pre-employment drug tests (“a test to determine the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered a medical examination”), and allows an employer to validate the test results by asking about lawful drug use or possible explanations for the positive result other than illegal use of drugs. However, as this case makes clear, disability-related questions are prohibited. In fact, the Court in this case quotes the legislative history of the ADA to point out that the drug-test exemption “should not conflict with the right of individuals who take drugs under medical supervision not to disclose their medical condition before a conditional offer of employment has been given.” Therefore, while an employer may conduct follow-up questions in response to a positive drug test, there are specific limitations on the types of information that can be elicited by someone other than a medical officer. While BEHI’s procedure to have an MRO conduct follow-up questioning may have been consistent with the ADA, Anthony’s presence during Harrison’s responses and revelation of his medical condition was held by this Court to preclude summary judgment in favor of the company.
 

A former editorial writer for the Indianapolis Star who claimed that she lost her job because of her “traditional” Christian beliefs regarding homosexuality was unable to support claims of religious discrimination under Title VII, because she could not show that she met the legitimate business expectations of her employer. Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 7th Cir., No. 08-2050, December 8, 2009.

Linda Coffey worked as an editorial writer for The Indianapolis Star and claims that she left the newspaper as a victim of employment discrimination. Coffey alleged that she was discriminated against because she is a Christian who believes that homosexual conduct is sinful. After she filed a lawsuit, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the newspaper. That ruling was affirmed on appeal to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. (Note that Coffey filed her lawsuit along with another Star employee, James Patterson, who claimed age, race, and religious discrimination. His claim was dismissed, as well.)

The Indianapolis Star is that state’s largest newspaper. In 2003, Dennis Ryerson was named as the Star’s editor and vice president, and was responsible for newsroom staffing and editorial content. In that same year, Ryerson and Coffey, who was a member of the editorial department at the time, engaged in an e-mail exchange related to an editorial proposed by Coffey on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy protects adults engaging in private, consensual homosexual activity. Coffey, who describes herself as a “traditional Christian,” proposed an editorial that described, in graphic detail, HIV risks associated with such activity. Although Ryerson refused to publish that column, he said that he was open to publishing a less graphic column on the risks of unprotected sex. That refusal triggered an e-mail exchange that Ryerson perceived as an attempt by Coffey at workplace proselytizing, which he warned Coffey was inappropriate.

During this same period, Coffey had developed a habit of violating the Star’s overtime policy by failing to have her overtime pre-approved. Although she was warned of this violation, Coffey continued to do extra work without pre-approval, often submitting hours that were viewed by the paper as “excessive and unnecessary.” In September 2003, administrative oversight for the Star’s internship program was transferred from Coffey to the newsroom editor, leaving Coffey with a less than full-time position. Although Ryerson offered Coffey a full-time position on the copy-desk, Coffey preferred editorial writing and resigned rather than transfer. On her last day at the Star, Coffey sent an e-mail stating that she had “enjoyed and appreciated” her work on the paper. However, in her lawsuit, Coffey claimed that the proposed transfer to the copy department was an adverse action, based on religious discrimination.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of Coffey’s claims, stating that Coffey could not show that she met the Star’s legitimate performance expectations, because the undisputed evidence showed that Coffey continually had violated the paper’s overtime policy. Further, to the extent that Coffey claimed that Ryerson would have permitted someone who did not share Coffey’s religious views to remain in the editorial department notwithstanding violation of company rules, Coffey failed to show that a similarly situated employee (an editorial writer who repeatedly violated overtime rules) who did not hold her same religious beliefs (that homosexual conduct is “sinful”) was treated more favorably and, therefore, Coffey was unable to support her prima facie case of religious discrimination. Moreover, Coffey’s claim of “constructive discharge” was belied by her final e-mail, which expressed no complaint or concerns.

While claims of religious discrimination should be taken seriously by employers, such claims do not overshadow an employee’s duty to meet legitimate job responsibilities. In order to effectively establish the defense asserted by the Star in this case, an employer should have a written job description that sets forth the responsibilities of the employees. In addition, clear, objective, and complete records of the individual employee’s performance should be made and kept by the employer, in order to support the assertion that the employee has not met the employer’s legitimate expectations. In this case, documentation of meeting and warnings associated with Coffey’s violation of the overtime policy was critical in establishing Coffey’s failure to meet her employer’s expectations.
 

In October 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued final guidelines, which became effective on December 1, 2009, regarding the use of “endorsements and testimonials” in advertising. “Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising,” 16 CFR Part 255. Under those guidelines, employees who use social media like blogs or Facebook to make statements about their employers’ products may create unintended legal liability for their employers if a consumer later claims to have been misled into purchasing an allegedly dangerous or defective product by such a posting.

Under the guidelines, the FTC defines an “endorsement” as an advertising message that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than a sponsoring advertiser. An endorsement must not include any representation that would be deceptive if made directly by the sponsoring advertiser. Further, the guidelines specifically state that companies are subject to liability for false or unsubstantiated statements made through endorsements, or for failing to disclose material connections between themselves and their endorsers. Importantly, the guidelines impose liability on endorsers and companies who fail to disclose “material connections” between an endorser and the company about whose products that endorser comments.

Therefore an employee who uses electronic media, including e-mail, blogs, or social networking sites, to make comments about a product made by his or her employer, and who fails to disclose his or her relationship with that manufacturer may create legal liability under the FTC guidelines. Further, should a consumers rely on a particular comment in that posting to his or her detriment, any ensuing damage could be attributed to the manufacturer/company.

A clearly written, widely distributed, and consistently enforced social media policy can help to avoid liability for violation of these FTC guidelines. Because the guidelines are designed to protect consumers against misleading advertising and endorsements, a company’s written directive to its employees to avoid publishing “endorsements” that are misleading or in which the employee’s relationship to the company is not revealed can help to avoid legal liability.

While the FTC’s own comments to the guidelines include a statement that the Commission would be “unlikely” to take action against a company for the conduct of a single “rogue” employee who violates a company’s social media policy via an illegal endorsement, that comment remains to be tested. Should a non-compliant endorsement create broad consumer injury or damage, the endorser’s employer may find that it cannot escape associated liability under the new guidelines. While guidelines themselves do not have the same force that a statute does, courts view them as an indication of how a law should be interpreted, and often act consistently with them.

Employers should review their written social media policies, and should assure that its employees are aware of the fact that the company has a concern and an interest in employees’ comments about company products. Further, employers should take action when an employee acts in violation of an applicable social media policy, in order to insure its own credibility during a review of the situation by the FTC.
 

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and parallel state statutes, an employer cannot take an adverse action against an employee because of that person’s disability or perceived disability. However, an employer is justified in taking such action if the action is based upon a legitimate business reason, and if that reason is not simply a pretext for discrimination. A Tennessee district court has held that firing an employee because of fear of potential violence by that individual is a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for an employee’s termination, in spite of the fact that the employee had been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder. Calandriello v. Tennessee Processing Ctr., M.D. Tenn., No. 3:08-1099, Dec. 15, 2009.

Robert Calandriello sued his former employer, Tennessee Processing Center (TPC) for disability discrimination under the state’s anti-discrimination statute. The company filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The court’s decision was premised on the third step of the shifting burden analysis, which requires an employee to disprove the company’s “legitimate business reason” for an adverse employment action.

Beginning in 2005, Calandriello worked at TPC’s Nashville location, which processed business data on which U.S. government stock and wire transfers were based. Because of the nature of the business conducted, TPC operated under certain security protections including FBI record checks for employees, a gated facility, and retinal scans for employee access.

In September 2007, TPC issued a “final warning” to Calandriello after learning that Calandriello had used company equipment to modify a company poster by adding a photo of Charles Manson. During the disciplinary process, Calandriello acknowledged that he made a poor choice in displaying the poster, but informed TPC (for the first time) that he suffered from bi-polar disorder which, he said caused that lapse in judgment. Calandriello also argued that because he had not destroyed company property, threatened anyone, or caused financial loss to the company, he should be exempt from disciplinary action, because he was entitled to “accommodation” under the ADA.

In spite of that, Calandriello was fired after further investigation showed that he had viewed online images of violence, assault weapons, and serial killers on his company computer. TPC’s action was based on a “loss of confidence” in Calandriello, and a concern that Calandriell’s continued employment posed a risk of workplace violence. Calandriello admitted to viewing sites about assault weapons and serial killers, but argued that guns were a “constant conversation topic” in the workplace at TPC.

Nonetheless, the court found in favor of TPC, holding that “fear of potential violence is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action,” including termination, and quoted a federal appellate court opinion that the ADA “does not require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee.” It further found that Calandriello was unable to provide evidence that the reason given by TPC for the termination was simply a pretext for discrimination. TPC was able to substantiate its position by citing a written company policy that specifically prohibited employees from visiting internet sites that are “known to contain or are suspected of containing objectionable matter” including “profane or otherwise inflammatory material.”

This case should not be viewed as a blank check for the discipline or termination of employees with bi-polar disorder. The deciding factors here included the high security workplace and the written company policies related to company computers. Further, the fact that the company was unaware of Calandriello’s impairment until after its initial disciplinary action supports its argument that the termination was based on “legitimate non-discriminatory” reasons. Employers should view issues related to medical and psychological impairments on a case-by-case basis to assure compliance with both state and federal laws.
 

On December 21, 2009, just in time for the holidays, and as part of the 2010 appropriations bill for the Defense Department (the Act), President Barack Obama signed into law an extension to the subsidy for COBRA created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The legislation extended the period during which involuntary terminations would trigger subsidy eligibility, as well as expanding the duration of the subsidy. Employers and plan administrators also will face new notice and administrative requirements to implement the subsidy extension on a retroactive basis. Below are a few of the highlights.

First, the Act expands the maximum subsidy period from nine months to 15 months, including individuals currently receiving subsidized COBRA coverage.

Next, the Act extends the period during which a COBRA-qualifying event resulting from an involuntary termination of employment can trigger eligibility for the subsidy, extending the end of that period from December 31, 2009 to February 28, 2010.

The Act resolves a thorny issue created by the language of the ARRA regarding eligibility for the subsidy. Originally, the ARRA required that both the qualifying event and the beginning of the COBRA coverage period occur on or before December 31, 2009, for an individual to be eligible for the subsidy. This meant that individuals whose employment terminated in December and coverage expired on December 31, but whose COBRA coverage commenced on January 1, would not have been eligible. The Act changes this by conditioning subsidy eligibility solely on the timing of the qualifying event, which is the event causing the loss of coverage. Assistance-eligible individuals who experience an involuntary termination (a qualifying event) on or before February 28, 2010 would be eligible for the subsidy (even if their COBRA coverage would not start until March).

The Act also protects individuals who, before the Act, exhausted their nine months of subsidized COBRA coverage and then did not continue coverage by paying full COBRA premiums. Under a transition period, those individuals would be able to pay those premiums retroactively if they do so by a certain date – the later of February 19, 2010, or 30 days from receipt of a new required notice.

For those assistance-eligible individuals who exhausted their nine-month subsidy but continued to pay the full COBRA premium in order to keep coverage in place, the amendment allows employers to apply the same refund or crediting rules that were in the ARRA.

Plan administrators will be required to issue a notice describing the new subsidy rules to all individuals who were or are assistance-eligible individuals on or after October 31, 2009, or who are terminated from employment on or after October 31, 2009. In addition, the Act requires special notice to those assistance-eligible individuals who either dropped COBRA or paid the full premium for it when their nine-month subsidy ended, explaining that they are now eligible either to reinstate their coverage retroactively at the subsidized rate or to receive a credit or refund if they paid more than the Act would have required.

The other terms and conditions of the initial COBRA subsidy will continue to apply (see Ogletree Deakins’ April 2, 2009 E-Alert). Should you have any questions about this legislation or its impact on employers, contact the Ogletree Deakins attorney with whom you normally work or the Client Services Department at 866-287-2576 or via e-mail at clientservices@ogletreedeakins.com.

 

In an unpublished opinion, the 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an employee who requested a leave of absence to consult an orthopedic surgeon was unable to prove that the absence would allow him to perform the essential functions of his position. Therefore, the absence was not a "reasonable accommodation" for purposes of the ADA. Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 2d Cir., No. 09-1444, unpublished, 11/17/09.

George Graves worked as a paper inspector for Finch Pruyn & Company. Graves requested an unpaid leave of absence from his job to consult with a surgeon about a foot problem from which he suffered. When Graves subsequently was terminated from his employment, he sued the company for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Finch’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the district court, which held that the leave sought by Graves was not a reasonable accommodation and, therefore, that Graves was unable to set forth the required prima facie case. On appeal, that decision was upheld by the Second Circuit.

Under the ADA a "reasonable accommodation" is something that enables a disabled employee to perform the essential functions of his job. An employer typically is required to engage in an interactive process with a disabled employee and to work with him to implement a reasonable accommodation, unless such accommodation creates an undue hardship for the company. In Grave’s case, there was no dispute that immediately prior to the request for leave, Graves could not perform the essential functions of his job, which required standing for long periods of time and lifting and pushing large rolls of paper. His request for a leave of absence was for the specific purpose of consulting with a surgeon. However, the request included no assurance that such consultation would then allow Graves to be able to perform the essential functions of his job. In fact, a report from one of Graves doctors indicated that it was "unlikely" that Graves could return to his previous occupation after the contemplated surgery. Further, the same doctor provided a report that ultimately allowed Graves to qualify for a disability retirement. Based on all of this, the Court concluded that the evidence did not provide assurance that Graves’ would ever be able to perform the essential functions of his job, even with the request two-week leave of absence. Graves therefore could not support the element of his prima facia case that required him to show that he was able to do the essential functions of his job with an accommodation.

The Court made an additional, and notable, point: that an employee may not rely on a company’s failure to engage in the interactive process if he cannot also show that a reasonable accommodation actually exists at the time of the complained-of adverse action. Employers should not interpret this holding to mean that they can ignore the obligation to interact with an employee regarding a requested accommodation. Instead, an employer should recognize that before rejecting an employee’s request for job modification, full and considered evaluation of the proposed "accommodation" should be done in order to determine whether such request will enable the individual to return to his or her essential functions.

In an unpublished opinion, the 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has held that an employee of the New York City Department of Education could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, because she could not prove herself to be “otherwise qualified” within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Rios v. Dept. of Education, 2d Cir., No. 08-1262-cv, unpublished, November 2, 2009.

Wilda Rios, an employee of the New York City Department of Education (DOE), alleged that her employment termination was based upon her disability, and that the employer’s claim that she was terminated for attendance policy violations was simply a pretext for that discrimination. When the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Education, Rios appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that Rios’ frequent absences removed her from the protection of the ADA.

Discriminatory discharge claims under the ADA are reviewed under the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden analysis. That analysis requires the plaintiff first to set forth a prima facie case showing that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and is “otherwise qualified” to perform the essential functions of the job in spite of the disability, with or without reasonable accommodation. Next, the employer is required to proffer a “legitimate business reason” for its adverse employment action. The final burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must prove that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext, and that the actual reason for the adverse action is discrimination.

In Rios’ case, there was documentary evidence that Rios “repeatedly failed to show up for work on time or at all for a variety of reasons, many of which were unrelated to her claimed disability.” In response to those absences, the DOE imposed certain disciplinary actions, and ultimately terminated Rios’ employment.

While Rios claimed that her firing was based upon her disability, the DOE argued that her attendance at work was an essential function of her position. The Court agreed with the employer, and specifically found that by imposing discipline for Rios’ excessive absences, the DOE demonstrated the essential nature of Rios’ attendance and punctuality to her job. Because Rios was unable to establish a regular attendance pattern, she was not “otherwise qualified” to fulfill one of the essential functions of the position, and therefore was unable to establish a prima facie case under the ADA. In addition, even if the Court had found that Rios’ prima facie case had been effectively established, the DOE’s motion for summary judgment would have been granted on the basis that Rios showed no actual evidence that the DOE’s legitimate business reason for Rios’ firing was simply a pretext for discrimination.

This case shows the importance of the consistent enforcement of an employer’s attendance policy (and documentation of an employee’s violation of that policy) to the defense of a claim of discrimination under the ADA. By implementing and enforcing such a policy, an employer indicates the essential nature of an employee’s attendance, and can use such information to underscore the legitimacy of disciplinary actions related to an employee’s violation of the same.
 

In an unpublished opinion, the 3d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has reminded employers of the importance of acting consistently with written policies, and of documenting that action. Coleman v. Blockbuster, Inc., 3d Circ., No. 08-4056, November 17, 2009. In that case, the Court upheld summary judgment in favor of an employer on the basis of the company’s ability to support its proffered “legitimate business reason” for the termination of a company manager for closing a store early and leaving the premises for a family emergency.

Tyra Coleman, an African American female, was hired by Blockbuster in September 2003 and was promoted to the position of store manager a few months later. However, after a series of disciplinary actions, Coleman was fired on June 22, 2004. In April 2004, Coleman had received two written “Corrective Action Reports” (CARs) for her store’s poor operational performance. On June 11, she received a third CAR when she missed a mandatory team meeting, and brought her two-year-old grandson to work with her. The third CAR was treated as a last chance agreement and read, in part, “Failure to improve will result in termination of employment.” On June 15, 2004, Coleman closed the store early and left the premises, ostensibly because of a medical emergency involving her minor son. Her employment was terminated the following week.

Coleman ultimately filed a lawsuit, claiming that the actual reason for her termination was race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Blockbuster; that decision was upheld on appeal.

Employment discrimination claims typically are analyzed under a “burden shifting” framework which requires an employer to offer a legitimate business reason for its action. In this case, Blockbuster argued that it acted pursuant to its written policy of progressive discipline. Coleman countered that the company acted “too harshly” when it fired her for her son’s emergency, and asserted that such harshness was an indication that the firing was racially motivated.

The Third Circuit pointed to the fact that whether or not Coleman believed her termination to have been “harsh,” she was unable to demonstrate that Blockbuster treated her less favorably than other, non-minority employees. To the contrary, the Court found that “Blockbuster came forward with solid evidence to demonstrate that the reason for Coleman’s termination was her dereliction of duty.” The Court pointed out that the company’s operating procedures allow the company certain discretion in its disciplinary measures, including the application of “more stringent penalties” for an employee – like Coleman – who already is in the progressive disciplinary system at the time of an additional infraction. While Coleman disputed certain factual evidence, she was unable to show any evidence that even suggested that her termination was motivated by her race, and not by her “dereliction of duty,” as stated by the company.

There is no doubt that Blockbuster’s documentation of its disciplinary actions, and its compliance with its progressive disciplinary policy (which gave it broad discretion to accelerate disciplinary measures when deemed appropriate) were the keys to its success against Coleman’s claims of discrimination in this case.
 

With little fanfare and even less reaction from employers, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) took effect on November 21, 2009. GINA generally prohibits employers, employment agencies, and unions from collecting genetic information – which specifically includes family medical history – related to employees or applicants. The law also precludes any type of genetic testing of employees or applicants.

The procedures and remedies associated with GINA parallel those of Title VII, the federal non-discrimination law, and prohibit discrimination in hiring, training, and placement of individuals because of their genetic information. GINA’s provisions related to the treatment and non-disclosure of genetic information are taken from the Americans with Disabilities Act’s procedures regarding the confidentiality of medical information. GINA generally precludes employers from obtaining and sharing medical information that falls within the definition of genetic information.

While GINA is now in effect, the EEOC’s final rule, which will provide direction regarding enforcement, has not yet been issued. The proposed regulations are in the final stages of review, but there has been no word as to when the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will approve those regs. Once approved, the regulations will face a final vote by the EEOC commissioners, and a subsequent final publication in the federal register.

Employers’ preparation for that final approval should include updating workplace posters (the EEOC already has issued a revised version of its anti-discrimination poster that includes reference to GINA), revising handbook and policy manuals, and generally informing and training supervisors and managers that genetic bias is now prohibited. That training should include the warning that companies may be held liable for retaliation under GINA is they take adverse action against an employee or applicant whose genetic information has been disclosed to the company, even if that disclosure was made through informal communication. Therefore, companies should be sensitive to the day-to-day conversations among employees, and should take action to prevent or stop discussions related to an individual’s family medical history, in order to prevent such information from becoming the actual or perceived basis for subsequent adverse employment actions, either of which could form the basis of a claim of discrimination under GINA.